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SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 
THE MAJORITY’S TYRANNY TOWARD UNEQUAL EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 
LAURA MCNEAL* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under our Constitution, majority rule is not without limit. Our system of 
government is predicated on an equilibrium between the notion that a majority 
of citizens may determine governmental policy through legislation . . . 
nonetheless some things the Constitution forbids even a majority of citizens to 
do.1 
For years, stakeholders in education have worked tirelessly to ensure that 
every child, regardless of his or her race, class, gender, or racial and ethnic 
identity, has access to equal educational opportunity. Despite these efforts, the 
opportunity gap in K-12 schools continues to grow and racial disparities in 
education remain a prominent fixture in the education milieu. Many legal 
scholars characterize the failed education reform efforts in the aftermath of 
Brown v. Board of Education as a slow retreat from substantive equality. This 
is primarily due to the Court’s transition from judicial activism for 
disadvantaged minorities through race-conscious measures to post-racial 
determinism—the notion that any use of race is presumptively unconstitutional 
since all state-sponsored discrimination has been eradicated.2 This doctrinal 
shift toward post-racial determinism is further evidenced by a series of rulings 
in the post-Brown era that undermined efforts to create diverse and equitable 
 
* Professor Laura McNeal is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Louisville 
Brandeis School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Cedric Merlin Powell, University of 
Louisville, and Professor Tanya Washington, Georgia State University, for their thoughtful 
comments and invaluable insight. My thanks to the St. Louis University Law Journal Editorial 
Board, especially Jay Ji, Symposium Managing Editor, for his flexibility and patience in working 
to bring this Article to publication. 
 1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1667 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 2. Cedric Merlin Powell, Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racial Determinism, 53 
WASHBURN L.J. 451, 452–53 (2014). 
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schools under the guise of neutrality.3 The judicial endorsement of color-blind 
rhetoric, despite the glaring racial disparities in education achievement 
outcomes, has been an effective tool in limiting the use of race-conscious 
measures in education. Although opponents of the use of race-conscious 
policies to integrate public schools have relied heavily on the judicial system to 
further their interests, there is a burgeoning movement to further those goals 
through the political process. 
For decades, the Supreme Court has played an integral role in shaping the 
structure of our democratic process. At the heart of our democratic system is 
the principle of equal participation through the concept one man, one vote.4 In 
the context of education, the political process can be used as a path toward 
educational equity through the enactment of laws designed to ensure that every 
child has equal educational opportunity regardless of his or her race, ethnicity, 
class, gender, or sexual orientation. But what happens when the political 
process is used to hinder as opposed to promote educational equity? Or when 
the majority capitalizes on knowledge that minorities are politically a 
paradigmatically powerless group by asserting its advantage to enact state laws 
that undermine minority interests?5 The very essence of democracy is premised 
on the belief that every individual should have an equal voice in the political 
process. However, how do you preserve the founding principles of democracy, 
which is a system that recognizes each individual’s right to civic participation, 
while preventing those rights from being altered or discarded by a tyranny of 
the majority?6 The recent Supreme Court ruling in Schuette v. Coalition to 
 
 3. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 
(2007) (“The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit 
racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Narrow tailoring requires ‘serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’”); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (arguing that public education should not be a 
system based upon wealth, but instead should be a system of “fiscal neutrality”), rev’d, 411 U.S. 
1 (1973). See also Cedric Merlin Powell, Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity, 
Results, and Neutrality, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 279 (2012) (“[Milliken v. Bradley] is a 
seminal decision because it literally changes the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
school cases and beyond. It lays the doctrinal groundwork for the post-racial Parents Involved 
decision, and it sets the stage for the post-racial merging of Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII 
principles in Ricci. The doctrinal thread that runs through all of the decisions is the protection of 
white interests and privilege. The Court literally ignores evidence of systemic racial 
discrimination in order to preserve suburban school districts and insulate them from the burden of 
urban integration.”). 
 4. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–61 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 
7–8 (1964). 
 5. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 84 
(1980). 
 6. See Thomas L. Murphy, The Dangers of Overreacting to “Judicial Activism,” UTAH 
B.J., Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 38, 41. 
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Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) addresses this very quandary 
through the lens of the political process doctrine. 
Manipulating the political process for the purpose of oppressing minority 
groups violates the spirit and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. A core 
strand of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is to ensure that 
all citizens have the right to meaningfully participate in the democratic 
process.7 Restructuring the political process to unfairly burden minorities for 
the purpose of hindering their ability to represent their interests is an act of 
moral exclusion. According to Moral Exclusion Theory, moral exclusion may 
be defined as “a psychosocial orientation toward certain individuals or groups 
for whom justice principles or considerations of fairness and allocation of 
resources are not applicable.”8 Moral exclusion serves as a breeding ground for 
discrimination, prejudice, and practices that benefit the majority at the expense 
of the minority. Under Moral Exclusion Theory, the dominant group creates 
moral boundaries in which those considered outside the boundaries (i.e. the 
minority group) are expendable and any harm inflicted upon them is 
considered just.9 Examining the intersection of moral exclusion and the 
political process doctrine is an important step toward understanding barriers to 
educational equity in K-12 schools. 
The Schuette decision has alarming implications for equal education 
opportunity because it constitutionalized statewide reverse discrimination suits 
and thus will have the effect of overturning what is left of race-conscious 
measures designed to create diverse and equitable learning environments. This 
Article will highlight how the Court’s decision in Schuette morally excludes 
minority children from equal educational opportunity. Part I will provide a 
brief doctrinal history of the road to Schuette through a discussion of the 
emergence of the political process doctrine and equal protection jurisprudence 
in the pre-Schuette era. Part II examines the Court’s decision in Schuette to 
highlight how the Court misapplied the political process doctrine to advance 
the rhetoric of neutrality. Part III of the article highlights how the Schuette 
Court’s interpretation of the political process doctrine promotes the moral 
exclusion of minority children from equal educational opportunity. Part IV will 
conclude with a discussion of how to transition from moral exclusion to moral 
 
 7. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651 (2014) (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). 
 8. Laura Leets, Interrupting the Cycle of Moral Exclusion: A Communication Contribution 
to Social Justice Research, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1859, 1860 (2001). 
 9. Susan Opotow, Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction, J. SOC. ISSUES, Spring 
1990, at 1, 1. 
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inclusion of minority children in K-12 education milieus in the post-Schuette 
Era. 
I.  THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE: 
THE ROAD TO SCHUETTE 
Racial preferences in the context of governmental decision-making have 
been a long and heated debate in the public sphere, especially in the context of 
education. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is often 
at the center of legal disputes regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious 
policies. Although the Supreme Court promoted diverse and equitable learning 
environments through a series of landmark education law cases,10 there are 
strong indices that affirmative action policies are in their final days. In recent 
years, equal protection jurisprudence has shifted from race-conscious to race-
neutral approaches to educational equity.11 Advocates of color-blind 
approaches to equal opportunity have developed a unique strategy to 
prohibiting the use of racial preferences in government decision-making under 
the guise of neutrality through the state political process. Specifically, several 
states have passed referendums that invalidate the use of racial preferences in 
governmental decisions.12 As a result, the political process doctrine emerged as 
a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of these controversial ballot 
initiatives. 
The central purpose of the political process doctrine is to safeguard 
minorities’ rights to equal participation in the political process.13 Under the 
political process doctrine, a governmental action violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of minority groups when the following two criteria are met: 
 
 10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that (1) the law school had a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body, and (2) the admissions program was 
narrowly tailored to serve its compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow 
from a diverse student body and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Regents of 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (“The fourth goal asserted by [the 
university] is the attainment of a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
493–95 (1954) (“In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms. . . . We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ 
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”). 
 11. Powell, supra note 2. 
 12. Peter M. Bean, Have We Reached Grutter’s “Logical End Point?” The Fight Over State 
Law Bans on Preferential Treatment Programs and the Future of Affirmative Action in the United 
States, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 485, 490 (2014). 
 13. Lisa White Shirley, Comment, Reassessing the Right of Equal Access to the Political 
Process: The Hunter Doctrine, Affirmative Action, and Proposition 209, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1415, 
1416–17 (1999). 
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(1) the governmental action has a racial focus and targets a program that 
primarily benefits minorities, and (2) the governmental action restructures the 
political process in a way that places a unique burden on racial minorities’ 
ability to advocate for their own interests. This section will briefly highlight 
the three seminal cases that collectively provide the doctrinal framework for 
the political process doctrine. 
A. Political Process Doctrine Trilogy: Hunter, Seattle, and Crawford 
1. Hunter v. Erickson: Burdens Minority Interests 
The central issue in Hunter14 was whether an amendment to a city charter 
to prevent a city council from implementing a fair housing ordinance without 
the approval of the majority of Akron voters violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.15 In this case, the plaintiff, an African American woman, alleged she 
was denied equal opportunity to live in certain residences because the owners 
specified to her real estate agent their refusal to sell to minorities.16 As a result, 
she was not permitted to view certain properties because of her race.17 Prior to 
the plaintiff’s incident, the Akron City Council enacted a fair housing 
ordinance to address this type of housing discrimination to ensure that all 
individuals, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry, 
have equal opportunity to the same available housing facilities.18 The central 
goal of the city’s fair housing ordinance was to deter discriminatory housing 
practices that promoted substandard, unsafe, segregated housing for 
minorities.19 Following the passage of the city’s anti-discrimination housing 
ordinance, voters in opposition of the anti-discrimination ordinance amended 
the city charter through a ballot initiative requiring a majority vote at a general 
election to approve any law which regulates any aspect of the real estate 
market based on considerations of race.20 Thus, this ballot initiative only 
permitted the passage of race-conscious anti-discrimination housing laws 
 
 14. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 15. Id. at 386. 
 16. Id. at 387. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 386. The year the Akron City Council enacted the Fair Housing Act was 1964, 
which coincided with the historic passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. During this era in U.S. 
history, a significant number of legal milestones were passed to support the spirit and purpose of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: equality regardless of an individual’s 
race, class, gender, religion, or national origin. 
 19. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (“The preamble to the open housing ordinance which was 
suspended by § 137 recited that the population of Akron consists of ‘people of different race, 
color, religion, ancestry or national origin, many of whom live in circumscribed and segregated 
areas, under substandard unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions, because of 
discrimination in the sale, lease, rental and financing of housing.’”). 
 20. Id. at 387. 
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through the political process, removing the power from local city officials to 
do so. As a result, the city of Akron was unable to process the plaintiff’s 
housing discrimination complaint due to the recently passed anti-
discrimination housing ordinance that invalidated the fair housing ordinance 
absent a change in the charter amendment. As a result, the amendment left 
minority citizens, such as the plaintiff, with no protections from discriminatory 
housing practices. The plaintiff filed suit contending that the charter 
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.21 
The Hunter Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the charter 
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause.22 The Court reasoned that the 
charter amendment’s exclusive focus on antidiscrimination ordinances “places 
special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process” and is 
therefore not permitted.23 Government action may not be taken with the 
malicious intent to harm a racial minority.24 The Hunter case established the 
bedrock principle that a state may not restructure the procedures of the 
government for the purpose of targeting racial minorities, even if the manner is 
facially neutral.25 Since the charter amendment invalidated a law designed to 
protect racial minorities and altered the political process in a manner that 
resulted in invidious discrimination that burdened minority interests, the Court 
applied the most stringent scrutiny.26 In applying strict scrutiny, the Court 
found that the charter amendment was unconstitutional because Akron failed to 
provide a compelling governmental interest for the amendment.27 The Court 
rejected Akron’s principal argument in support of the charter amendment, 
which was based on the uncontested fact that fair housing legislation is likely 
to invoke a great deal of passion within the community.28 It was not necessary, 
 
 21. Id. at 387–88. 
 22. Id. at 393. 
 23. Id. at 391. 
 24. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392–93. 
 25. Id. at 391 (“Like the law requiring specification of candidates’ race on the ballot, 
Anderson v. Martin, [375 U.S. 399 (1964)], § 137 places special burdens on racial minorities 
within the governmental process. This is no more permissible than denying them the vote, on an 
equal basis with others.”). 
 26. Id. at 391–92 (“Because the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of 
meaningful and unjustified official distinctions based on race, racial classifications are 
‘constitutionally suspect,’ and subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’” (citations omitted)). 
 27. Id. at 392. Akron attempted to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to justify 
the discrimination that resulted from restructuring the political process by “[c]haracterizing it 
simply as a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of race relations.” Id. The Court 
rejected Akron’s argument, stating that the amendment was not needed to slow the pace of the 
public discourse and action in the area of race relations or to provide Akron citizens the 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Id. 
 28. Id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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however, to pass this amendment in order to assure that particularly sensitive 
issues would ultimately be decided by the general electorate.29 Akron had 
already established a procedure, which was based upon a neutral principle that 
mandated a general referendum on the issue with the support of at least ten 
percent of the voters.30 
The Hunter case is significant because the Court establishes one of the 
three core elements of the political process doctrine. Government restructuring 
that burdens racial minorities’ interests within the political process violates the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Hunter Court 
requires that the following two criteria be met to establish a racial 
classification: (1) the law at issue concerns a racial issue, and (2) the law 
restructures the political process in a way that burdens minority interests.31 
Additionally, under Hunter, the political process doctrine requires that strict 
scrutiny is the standard of review for any law that restructures the political 
process in a racial manner or shifts a decision related to race from one level of 
government to another.32 
2. Washington v. Seattle School District: Shifting Governmental 
Authority 
This case arose from attempts by the Seattle School District to remedy 
racially isolated schools due to de facto segregation.33 School district efforts to 
alleviate racial isolation through transfer programs and magnet schools were 
unsuccessful.34 As a result, Seattle School District implemented a mandatory 
busing program, called the Seattle Plan, for the purpose of creating racially 
diverse schools.35 Under the Seattle Plan, both black and white students were 
reassigned to promote diverse and equitable schools.36 Seattle residents who 
opposed the school district’s mandatory desegregation programs proposed a 
state law, Initiative 350, to prohibit mandatory busing policies to desegregate 
Seattle schools.37 Although Initiative 350 passed by an overwhelming majority 
of voters,38 the victory was short-lived. The Seattle School District filed a 
lawsuit against the State of Washington challenging the constitutionality of 
 
 29. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Shirley, supra note 13, at 1420–21. 
 32. See David R. Friedman, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the 
Forgotten Oath, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 117–18 (2013), available at http://www.stanford 
lawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/66_SLRO_117.pdf. 
 33. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460 (1982). 
 34. Id. at 461. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 461–62. 
 38. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 463. 
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Initiative 350 under the Equal Protection Clause, which guarantees racial 
minorities the right to fully participate in the political process.39 
According to the Court, the racial focus of Initiative 350 provoked the 
application of the Hunter doctrine.40 Relying upon and expanding the 
precedent established in Hunter, the Court held that Initiative 350 violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, although 
facially neutral, the initiative targeted a program designed to benefit racial 
minorities.41 Second, Initiative 350 reallocated governmental power to enact 
mandatory desegregation policies from local to state government.42 The 
redistribution of power created an unjustifiable discriminatory burden on racial 
minorities within the political process, making it more difficult to achieve 
legislation in their interests, which violates the Equal Protection Clause.43 This 
case is significant because it further developed the framework for the political 
process doctrine by establishing that government restructuring places an unfair 
discriminatory burden on minorities when it moves governmental decision-
making to develop policies benefiting minorities from a lower to higher level 
of government. 
3. Crawford v. Board of Education of L.A. 
The Crawford44 case is the last case in the political process doctrine 
trilogy. In this case, California voters passed Proposition I, an amendment to 
the California Constitution that limited state court-ordered busing to 
desegregate schools, except in instances where a federal court issued a busing 
mandate to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.45 The central issue in Crawford was whether Proposition I, which 
repealed legislation that benefited racial minorities, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.46 
In evaluating the constitutionality of Proposition I, the Court applied the 
political process doctrine, finding no constitutional violation where a state, 
through the political process, chooses to constrict its expansive busing program 
to align with the federal desegregation standards.47 The Court reasoned that a 
 
 39. Id. at 464, 467. 
 40. Id. at 467. In applying the Hunter doctrine to evaluate an Equal Protection challenge, the 
Court considered State actions that place special burdens on racial minorities to be “no more 
permissible” than denying these members the right to vote. Id. at 470. In effect, a stricter analysis 
is required “when the State allocates governmental power nonneutrally.” Id. 
 41. Id. at 484–85, 487. 
 42. Id. at 477. 
 43. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 483–84. 
 44. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). 
 45. Id. at 531–32. 
 46. Id. at 529. 
 47. Id. at 535. 
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state’s actions of simply repealing or revising desegregation or other laws 
designed to deter discrimination, in and of itself has “never . . . been viewed as 
embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.”48 The Court found no 
racial classification present in Proposition I because the law did not state that 
persons are to be treated differently due to their race.49 The Court further 
reasoned that Proposition I did not prohibit the enforcement of any federal law 
or constitutional mandate.50 To the contrary, Proposition I merely aligned itself 
with the desegregation criteria established by the Federal Constitution.51 
B. Equal Protection Jurisprudence in the Pre-Schuette Era 
Schuette arose during a paradigm shift in constitutional jurisprudence from 
the endorsement of race-conscious measures to race-neutrality in the pursuit of 
educational equity. Although it is a well-established principle in equal 
protection jurisprudence that limited uses of race is constitutionally permissible 
to enable students to receive the educational benefits that flow from diversity, 
preferential treatment of minorities has not gone unchallenged.52 Opponents of 
affirmative action admissions policies have initiated numerous equal protection 
challenges to the use of race in school admissions.53 It is within this backdrop 
that the Court has continued to grapple with the endemic challenge of 
promoting diverse and equitable learning environments while not 
disadvantaging minorities and non-minorities. To this end, the Supreme Court 
decisions in Bakke, Grutter, and Parents Involved have collectively served as a 
benchmark for constitutional analysis of race-conscious school admissions 
policies.54 
 
 48. Id. at 539. 
 49. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537–38 (“Indeed, even if Proposition I had a racially 
discriminatory effect, in view of the demographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or 
races would be affected the most or in what way. In addition, this Court previously has held that 
even when a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the 
Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.”). 
 50. Id. at 535. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 53. See id. (discussing whether the University of Michigan Law School’s use of racial 
preferences in student admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
710–11 (2007) (deciding an Equal Protection challenge to the use of a racial tie breaker in a K-12 
school assignment plan); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–71 (1978) 
(determining whether an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of a 
medical student’s application for admission violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 54. It is important to note the relevancy of the Supreme Court’s most recent affirmative 
action case, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). Since this Article focuses 
on the K-12 schooling system, the Fisher case will be discussed in a subsequent article, which 
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1. Regents of University of California v. Bakke 
Many legal scholars characterize Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke55 as a seminal case that changed the legal landscape in the context of 
higher education in ways that will be felt for generations to come.56 The central 
issue before the Court in Bakke was whether a university’s affirmative action 
admissions policy violated the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.57 
Bakke is significant in the equal protection jurisprudence milieu because it 
placed higher education admissions and race at the “forefront of constitutional 
law issues.”58 In this case, the plaintiff, a white male, applied twice for 
admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis.59 He was 
rejected both times. The controversy lies in the medical school’s admissions 
policy. The medical school had a race-conscious admissions policy that 
reserved sixteen places in each entering class for disadvantaged minority 
students in an effort to integrate the medical profession and increase the 
number of physicians willing to serve underserved populations.60 The 
plaintiff’s admissions criteria (college GPA and MCAT test scores) exceeded 
those of many of the minority students admitted during the two years his 
applications were rejected. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit contending that the 
medical school’s special admissions program excluded him on the basis of race 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 
A divided Court ruled that the university’s special admissions program was 
unconstitutional because it used explicit racial classifications to disregard 
individual rights by excluding them solely for not being a minority.62 The 
Court vehemently condemned this type of admissions policy for denying 
potential non-minority applicants the opportunity to compete for one of the 
available admissions seats.63 Additionally, the Court reasoned that, since the 
 
focuses solely on the implications of the Schuette decision on higher education school 
admissions. The Fisher case is significant because it presents for the first time the question of 
whether the success of a race-neutral policy demands that a university abandon the use of race as 
a factor in the admission of other students. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415. Additionally, the case 
provides a first opportunity to challenge the Court’s willingness to continue its deference to 
higher education administrators in their pursuit to achieve campus diversity through racial 
preferences. 
 55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
 56. Steven M. Kirkelie, Comment, Higher Education Admissions and Diversity: The 
Continuing Vitality of Bakke v. Regents of the University of California and an Attempt to 
Reconcile Powell’s and Brennan’s Opinions, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 616 (2002). 
 57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269–70. 
 58. Kirkelie, supra note 56, at 655. 
 59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. 
 60. Id. at 279. 
 61. Id. at 277–78. 
 62. Id. at 329. 
 63. Id. at 319–20. 
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plaintiff was unable to prove that the white applicant would not have been 
admitted in the absence of the racial preferences utilized in the special 
admissions program, he was entitled to be admitted.64 Lastly, the Court held 
that the use of race as one of “several” admissions criteria was constitutionally 
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.65 
The admissions plans at issue utilized a point system that consider things such 
as the applicant’s extra-curricular activities, GPA, MCAT score, and letters of 
recommendation, as opposed to relying exclusively on race in admissions 
decisions.66 
2. Grutter v. Bollinger 
This case challenged the constitutionality of the University of Michigan’s 
race-conscious school admissions policy that considered race in conjunction 
with several other factors, such as LSAT score, GPA, and letters of 
recommendation, when considering student applicants on an individual basis.67 
The goal of the race-conscious admissions program was to enroll a critical 
mass of diverse students for the purpose of obtaining the educational benefits 
that flow from diversity, such as promoting cross-cultural understanding and 
invalidating stereotypes.68 The admissions policy came under intense scrutiny 
when a white student applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law 
School and was denied admission despite having an LSAT score of 161 and a 
3.8 undergraduate GPA.69 The student filed a lawsuit challenging the 
university’s race-conscious admissions policy as a violation of her equal 
protection rights by discriminating against her on the basis of race.70 
The Supreme Court in Grutter held that the University of Michigan’s 
narrowly tailored use of race in their law school admissions for the purpose of 
furthering a compelling state interest in obtaining the educational benefits of 
diversity was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.71 The Court 
emphasized that the admissions program looked at each individual applicant on 
a case-by-case basis, and race or ethnicity was only considered as one of 
several factors in the admissions decision.72 Therefore, the university’s race-
conscious admissions program did not result in a quota.73 The University of 
 
 64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. 
 65. Id. at 314 (“Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a 
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”). 
 66. Id. at 274. 
 67. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311–16 (2003). 
 68. Id. at 316, 330. 
 69. Id. at 316. 
 70. Id. at 316–17. 
 71. Id. at 343. 
 72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37. 
 73. Id. at 335. 
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Michigan’s law school admissions office considered both quantitative and 
extracurricular qualifications, as well as each applicant’s potential for 
contribution to educational diversity.74 This case helped shape affirmative 
action jurisprudence in higher education by solidifying the legal principle that 
admissions programs may not use a quota system; however, considerations of 
race are permissible when each individual applicant is examined in a flexible, 
non-mechanical way. 
3. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Public Schools 
This case addressed the constitutionality of race-conscious school 
assignment plans in K-12 schooling systems. Ironically, more than fifty years 
ago, the Supreme Court justices in Brown, addressed whether public schools 
could be “required” to integrate,75 whereas the legal issue in Parents Involved 
was whether public schools are permitted to “voluntarily” integrate.76 In this 
case, de facto segregation within Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County 
Schools created racially segregated schools due to segregated housing 
patterns.77 In an effort to promote integration, both school districts adopted 
race-conscious school admissions policies.78 
The Seattle Public School system implemented a plan that used a series of 
tiebreakers to determine which students were admitted to oversubscribed 
schools.79 The first tiebreaker gave preference to students with a sibling 
attending the school.80 The second and most controversial tiebreaker to allocate 
spots in oversubscribed schools, classified students as white and non-white and 
gave preference to a student’s race for the purpose of achieving a target racial 
balance.81 Under the Jefferson County Schools plan, students are grouped into 
 
 74. Id. at 315–16. The Court stated: 
The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic ability coupled with a flexible 
assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential “to contribute to the learning 
of those around them.” The policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant 
based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of 
recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute 
to the life and diversity of the Law School . . . . The policy aspires to “achieve that 
diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law 
school class stronger than the sum of its parts.” The policy does not restrict the types of 
diversity contributions eligible for “substantial weight” in the admissions process, but 
instead recognizes “many possible bases for diversity admissions.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 75. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
 76. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007). 
 77. Id. at 712. 
 78. Id. at 726–27. 
 79. Id. at 711. 
 80. Id. at 711–12. 
 81. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712. 
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attendance zones based on their home address, which dictated initial school 
assignments.82 Next, parents and students were provided with various school 
choice options among educational programs and schools (e.g., magnet schools) 
within their designated attendance zone.83 The primary goal of the attendance 
zones and school choice opportunities was to maintain a minimum of fifteen 
percent and no more than fifty percent African American enrollment in each 
school for the purpose of achieving racially diverse schools.84 The parents of 
students attending the school districts filed suit alleging that the student 
assignment plans that relied on race classifications to assign students to schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.85 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the school 
assignment plans were unconstitutional because the school districts failed to 
show that the use of racial classifications was necessary to achieve their stated 
goal of racially diverse schools.86 In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned 
that the school districts failed to present any empirical evidence that the level 
of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits of 
diversity coincide with the racial demographics of the respective school 
districts.87 The Court further emphasized that the type of racial balancing used 
in the school assignment plans is not “transformed from ‘patently 
unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial 
diversity.’”88 Although the Parents Involved Court acknowledged that diversity 
is a compelling governmental interest, it denounced the type of racial 
proportionality utilized in the school assignment plans at issue in the case.89 
This case contributed to the affirmative action jurisprudence framework by 
establishing that the legal principles established in Grutter are not applicable in 
K-12 settings, because, unlike the university in Grutter, the school admissions 
policy in Parents Involved applied a very constricted approach to diversity 
(white, non-white classification) and failed to evaluate students on an 
individual basis. Lastly, the Parents Involved Court articulated the importance 
 
 82. Id. at 716. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 714. 
 86. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735. 
 87. Id. at 727 (“The district did not attempt to defend the proposition that anything outside 
its range posed the ‘specter of exceptionality.’ Nor did it demonstrate in any way how the 
educational and social benefits of racial diversity or avoidance of racial isolation are more likely 
to be achieved at a school that is 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian-American, which would 
qualify as diverse under Seattle’s plan, than at a school that is 30 percent Asian-American, 25 
percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white, which under Seattle’s 
definition would be racially concentrated.”). 
 88. Id. at 732. 
 89. Id. at 722, 732. 
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of school districts demonstrating that they made a good faith effort to consider 
race-neutral alternatives before using explicit racial classifications.90 Both 
Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public Schools failed to meet that 
burden. 
II.  EMPOWERING THE MAJORITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SCHUETTE V. 
COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
At first glance, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 
Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN)91 appears to be a case that challenges existing Supreme 
Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions 
policies. However, although the outcome of Schuette directly impacts the use 
of race in higher education school admissions, the issue is framed differently.92 
This case examined whether an amendment to a state constitution approved by 
the majority of voters can be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.93 
Since the historic Grutter decision in 2003, citizens of the state of 
Michigan and beyond have engaged in discourse surrounding the use of race-
conscious admissions policies in higher education. Michigan voters responded 
to the existing equal protection jurisprudence permitting limited use of race in 
school admissions by spearheading a movement to amend the state constitution 
to rescind affirmative action admissions policies through a ballot initiative, 
Proposal 2.94 Under Proposal 2, it is unconstitutional for elected members of a 
university’s governing board to establish race-conscious admissions programs 
in Michigan.95 Successful anti-affirmative action grass roots efforts propelled 
Proposal 2 to Michigan’s 2006 election ballot for consideration.96 Proposal 2 
passed by a margin of fifty-eight percent to forty-two percent and was enacted 
as article I, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution.97 Section 26 of the 
constitution reads in part as follows: 
 
 90. Id. at 735. 
 91. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 92. See id. at 1630.The Court emphasized, however, that the guiding principle regarding the 
constitutionality of considerations of race in higher education admissions remained unchanged. 
See id. 
 93. Id. at 1629–30. 
 94. Christopher E. D’Alessio, Note, A Bridge Too Far: The Limits of the Political Process 
Doctrine in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y SIDEBAR 103, 103 (2013), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1108&context=djclpp_sidebar. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 105. 
 97. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629. 
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  (1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State 
University, and any other public or college university, community college or 
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting. 
  (2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment 
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or 
public contracting. 
  (3) For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not necessarily 
limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or 
community college, school district, or other political subdivision or 
governmental instrumentality of or within the State of Michigan not included 
in subsection 1.98 
Opponents of the passage of Proposal 2 responded with two legal challenges to 
the constitutionality of article I, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution.99 
Among the plaintiffs asserting the legal challenge were the Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality 
By Any Means Necessary (BAMN); faculty; and current and prospective 
students to Michigan public universities.100 The defendants included the 
governor, Board of Trustees of Michigan State University, Board of Governors 
of Wayne State University, and the Board of Regents of the University of 
Michigan.101 The district court consolidated the cases and granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, thus upholding Proposal 2.102 
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals after the district court denied a motion to reconsider 
summary judgment.103 The Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of summary 
judgment, holding that Proposal 2 violated the legal principles set forth in 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,104 which, according to the Sixth 
 
 98. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 99. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629. 
 100. Id. at 1629–30. 
 101. Id. at 1630. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. 
by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 
2012), rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight to Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). In 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court held an initiative prohibiting school boards 
from requiring any student to attend a school other than the school geographically nearest the 
student’s residence violated the Equal Protection Clause. 458 U.S. 457, 462, 487 (1982). The 
initiative was passed in response to a mandatory busing program that was passed by the school 
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Circuit’s majority opinion, “mirrors the [case] before us.”105 Thus, in 
determining under what circumstances, if any, voters may choose to prohibit 
certain preferences, including race-based preferences in governmental decision 
making, the Court relied heavily on the precedent established in Washington v. 
Seattle School Dist No. 1106 and Hunter v. Erickson107 to resolve the case.108 
The central issue in Schuette was whether Michigan voters may use the 
political process (i.e. referendum) to prohibit race-conscious measures in 
governmental decisions, particularly with respect to school admissions.109 In 
this case, Michigan voters used the initiative system to circumvent the 
Supreme Court precedent in Grutter, Bakke, and Parents Involved, which 
permits race-conscious admissions policies.110 As previously discussed, in 
2003, the Court assessed the constitutionality of the University of Michigan’s 
 
board. Id. at 461–62. The Court held the initiative unconstitutional because it shifted educational 
decision-making to the state. Id. at 474. Furthermore, the state used the racial nature of the issue 
to define the state’s decision-making structure. Id. The Court concluded that the shift in decision-
making authority imposed substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities. Id. 
 105. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630. 
 106. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 487. 
 107. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 108. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1631–33. It is helpful to highlight the relevant case, Reitman v. 
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), that preceded the Seattle case and helped establish the legal 
framework for the political process doctrine at the center of the Schuette case. In Mulkey, 
California voters amended the state constitution to protect an owner’s choice to decline to rent or 
sell residential property from any type of prohibition or interference by the state legislature. 
Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 371. In this case, two couples experienced discriminatory housing practices. 
Id. at 372. One couple was evicted from their apartment and another denied the opportunity to 
rent an apartment, both were on account of race. Id. Additionally, in both cases the victims were 
barred from utilizing the protection of California’s statutes that prohibit discrimination due to the 
amendment to the state constitution, granting owners the freedom to decline to rent or sell 
residential property on any basis, including race. Id. The plaintiffs, the two couples discriminated 
against, challenged the constitutionality of the amendment. Id. at 373. The Court held that the 
amendment was unconstitutional because the “immediate design and intent” of the law was to 
solidify a constitutional right to discriminate. Id. at 374. The dissent incorrectly reasoned that the 
amendment was constitutional because the voter’s actions were not intended to encourage 
discrimination, but rather ensuring that the State of California would remain a neutral party in the 
renting and selling of private property. Id. at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 109. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629. 
 110. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722 (2007) 
(“The second government interest we have recognized as compelling for purposes of strict 
scrutiny is the interest in diversity in higher education.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 
(2003) (“Universities can, however, consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in 
the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”); Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (“[T]he State has a substantial interest that legitimately 
may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration 
of race and ethnic origin.”). 
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school admissions policies and found no constitutional violation in their 
limited use of race-conscious measures.111 
III.  POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE: A TOOL FOR MORAL EXCLUSION IN K–12 
SCHOOLS 
The Schuette decision and education reform efforts that discount the 
significance of race to promote equal educational opportunity represent the 
moral exclusion of one of the most vulnerable sectors of our population, 
minority children, under the guise of neutrality. Moral exclusion is “a 
psychosocial orientation toward certain individuals or groups for whom justice 
principles or considerations of fairness and allocation of resources are not 
applicable.”112 Thus, moral exclusion occurs when groups or individuals create 
moral boundaries which are used to exclude others from equitable treatment 
and considerations of fairness.113 Excluded individuals are perceived as 
nonexistent, expendable, and not worthy of being treated equal.114 Moral 
exclusion is also identified as a continuous construct that varies in degree 
depending on the severity of the situation.115 Assessing the concept of moral 
exclusion from the perspective of a continuum gives an insightful perspective 
into the extreme separation between those that are within the moral community 
and those that are excluded. 
There are numerous psychological factors that contribute to the moral 
exclusion of individuals within a society, such as altruism, stigma, 
discrimination, and prejudice.116 According to Moral Exclusion Theory, 
individuals who are a part of the dominant group perceive themselves and their 
group as more honest, fair, moral, and virtuous than those in the excluded 
group.117 The dominant group socially categorizes others based on things such 
as race, gender, and values, and excludes them from equal treatment on the 
basis of those differences.118 As a result, this theory contends that our natural 
tendency to socially categorize individuals serves as a breeding ground for 
moral exclusion. Extreme examples of moral exclusion include, but are not 
limited to, events such as the institution of slavery, the Holocaust, and the 
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Moral Exclusion 
Theory has been used as a conceptual framework to view various group 
dynamics in the field of sociology. However, in this Article, Moral Exclusion 
 
 111. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
 112. Leets, supra note 8. 
 113. Opotow, supra note 9. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Leets, supra note 8, at 1861. 
 116. Opotow, supra note 9, at 2. 
 117. Id. at 6. 
 118. Id. at 7. 
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Theory will be utilized as a theoretical lens to examine barriers to equal 
educational opportunity in the context of the recent Supreme Court decision in 
Schuette, which upheld the constitutionality of article I, section 26 of the 
Michigan Constitution, an anti-affirmative action ballot initiative.119 
Although the Schuette decision examined the use of race-conscious 
admissions policies in higher education, article I, section 26 explicitly states its 
applicability to K-12 schools as well: 
The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State 
University, and any other public college or university, community college, or 
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting.120 
Therefore, although this Article focuses on K-12 school systems, the 
debilitating effects of this law on equal educational opportunity will permeate 
both the K-12 and higher education milieus. 
A. Article I, Section 26 Morally Excludes Minority Children by Undermining 
Public School’s Ability to Create Diverse and Equitable Schools. 
The Schuette decision’s endorsement of article I, section 26 of the 
Michigan Constitution morally excludes minority students by undermining 
school leaders’ ability to create and maintain diverse and equitable schools. 
How can school leaders integrate racially segregated schools without race-
conscious admissions policies? Article I, section 26 comes at a tumultuous 
time in U.S. history where K-12 schools are rapidly re-segregating to the pre-
Brown era as school leaders, policymakers, and stakeholders in education 
struggle to dismantle dual education systems that unfairly disadvantage 
minorities and children living in poverty. The endemic challenge of remedying 
de jure and de facto segregation in K-12 public schools is not a new 
phenomenon, but well-established in social science literature.121 According to 
 
 119. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight 
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630, 1638 (2014). 
 120. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26. 
 121. Laura R. McNeal, The Re-Segregation of Public Education Now and After the End of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 41 EDUC. URB. SOC’Y 562, 564 (2009) (“The harsh reality is that 
more than 250 school districts still operate dual school systems, which are not only separate but 
inherently unequal as well. The rapid growth of segregated minority schools is most evident in 
urban settings, which are characterized by high-poverty, high-minority student populations. For 
example, large urban school districts such as Atlanta Public Schools and Chicago Public Schools 
have student populations that consist of 92% students of color and 8% White . . . .”); Gary Orfield 
& David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY 
L.J. 759, 761 (1993) (“The ideas, for example, that political conflict will diminish and that non-
judicial mechanisms can assure equity in the resegregated minority schools are not supported 
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educational researchers Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, characteristics of 
racially segregated schools are inadequate facilities, poor academic 
achievement outcomes, low graduation rates, and poor teacher quality.122 The 
Court’s deliberate indifference to the harmful effects of racially segregated 
schools results in the moral exclusion of minority children because they are 
treated as expendable and not worthy of being treated equally. The Court’s 
decision in Schuette to allow voters to restructure government decision-making 
not only limits the ability of minorities to advocate for their interests, but also 
undermines the spirit and purpose of Grutter, which is to ensure that all 
students receive the educational benefits that flow from diversity. 
Desegregating schools can only be achieved with laws and policies that 
promote diverse and equitable learning environments. Instead of promoting 
educational equity, the Schuette decision lays the foundation for laws like 
article I, section 26, which morally exclude minority students from receiving 
equal educational opportunity through the perpetuation of racially segregated 
schools. Article I, section 26 is a tool for moral exclusion because it is 
designed to create and maintain a dual education system between the haves and 
have-nots by removing the most effective remedy for de facto segregation in 
K-12 schools: race-conscious admissions policies.123 
Article I, section 26 also perpetuates one of the key indices of Moral 
Exclusion Theory, where the dominant group excludes a minority group from 
equal treatment and creates moral boundaries that distinguish who is entitled to 
resources and considerations of fairness. Specifically, article I, section 26 
morally excludes minority students by manipulating the political process to 
create moral boundaries between the voters with majority voting power and 
those with minority voting power. Article I, section 26 ensures that individuals 
within the moral boundaries have their educational interests represented, 
 
empirically in several districts.”); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS, 
ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 3 (2007) 
(“American schools, resegregating gradually for almost two decades, are now experiencing 
accelerating isolation and this will doubtless be intensified by the recent decision of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.”). 
 122. ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI, supra note 121, at 5 (“On average, segregated minority schools 
are inferior in terms of the quality of their teachers, the character of the curriculum, the level of 
competition, average test scores, and graduation rates.”). 
 123. It is important to note that advocates of race-neutral approaches to integrated racially 
segregated schools posit that the Socio-Economic Integration model will achieve the same results 
as race-conscious approaches. The Socio-Economic model uses students’ household income as a 
proxy for race. Although this integration strategy has shown positive results, it only works in 
limited settings. For example, using students’ socioeconomic status for school assignments is 
ineffective in large urban school districts with high concentrations of poverty among white and 
black students because assigning students based on income will not guarantee racial diversity. 
Thus, based on the integration strategies that are available race-conscious measures are the most 
effective remedy to eradicating racially isolated schools. See McNeal, supra note 121, at 571. 
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whereas those outside of the moral community are denied equal protection of 
the laws due to the majority’s manipulation of the political process in a manner 
that disadvantages racial minorities.124 
The Schuette Court’s deliberate indifference to the substandard education 
minority children receive in racially isolated schools, through the endorsement 
of democratically approved legislation that erects barriers to educational 
equity, demonstrates the Court’s continued retreat from the promise of 
Brown.125 Moreover, for the Court to allow the political process doctrine to be 
used in a manner that thwarts prior judicial efforts to promote educational 
equity and that constructs insurmountable hurdles for minorities to advocate 
for their education interests is also an indication of moral exclusion. The 
Schuette decision is also disconcerting because it is contrary to prior precedent. 
Hunter and Seattle substantiated a bedrock principle that is at the core of equal 
protection jurisprudence: “The majority may not suppress the minority’s right 
to participate on equal terms in the political process.”126 Despite this guiding 
doctrinal principle, the Schuette Court turned a blind eye to the harmful effects 
of article I, section 26 on minorities’ ability to represent their interests in the 
political process and allowed voters to circumvent school integration efforts. 
The Schuette Court’s application of the Hunter criteria to evaluate the 
constitutionality of section 26 under the political process doctrine was 
erroneous and perpetuates the moral exclusion of minority students. As 
previously stated, the Hunter Court requires that the following two criteria be 
met to establish a racial classification in violation of the political process 
doctrine: (1) the law at issue concerns a racial issue, and (2) the law 
restructures the political process in a way that burdens minority interests. 
Additionally, under Hunter the political process doctrine requires that strict 
scrutiny be used as the standard of review for any law that restructures the 
political process in a racial manner or shifts a decision related to race from one 
level of government to another. 
A strict application of the Hunter principles reveals the unconstitutionality 
of article I, section 26 and the Schuette Court’s gross error in application. First, 
section 26 focuses on race by prohibiting Michigan’s public schools from 
implementing race-conscious admissions policies.127 Second, section 26 
 
 124. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“But instead, the majority of 
Michigan voters changed the rules in the middle of the game, reconfiguring the existing political 
process in Michigan in a manner that burdened racial minorities.”). 
 125. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of 
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal.”). 
 126. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1659 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 127. Id. at 1629 (majority opinion). 
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restructures the political process in a manner that unfairly burdens minorities128 
by creating a higher standard for enacting race-conscious admissions plans for 
public schools.129 Instead of applying the correct application of the political 
process doctrine, the Court attempted to reinterpret Hunter and Seattle by 
refusing to acknowledge the “intentional and invidious” racial injury caused by 
section 26 to minority voters in Michigan.130 In addition, the Court’s complete 
disregard for the precedent established in Hunter and intentional re-
characterization of the principles set forth in Seattle demonstrate the Court’s 
commitment to color-blind rhetoric that allows the majority to restructure the 
political process to place minorities outside the moral boundaries with little 
recourse. 
Article I, section 26 further exacerbates the problem by removing the 
integration tool that has achieved the greatest degree of success in creating 
racially diverse learning environments, race-conscious policies. Other race-
neutral alternatives such as socioeconomic school assignment plans only work 
in limited education contexts where the majority of minority students are living 
in poverty.131 For example, utilizing socioeconomic status to assign students in 
a school district with a high-poverty student population among both white and 
black students is an ineffective integration tool because assigning students 
based on their household income will not create racial diversity. The 
implications for K-12 schools are alarming in the aftermath of the Schuette 
decision. How can K-12 schools prepare students for the increasingly global 
society in which we live in racially isolated learning environments? 
B. Article I, Section 26 Promotes the Moral Exclusion of Minority Children 
by Codifying Racial Discrimination into Law. 
Article I, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution promotes the re-
segregation of Michigan’s public schools by codifying racial discrimination 
into law. Although the majority attempts to discount the significance of the 
Schuette decision by stating that the case is not about the constitutionality of 
 
 128. Section 26 places a unique burden on minorities by requiring voters to amend the 
Constitution to permit the use of race in school admissions for the purposes of creating diverse 
and equitable schools. Prior to section 26, voters were allowed to lobby the university’s 
governing board. Id. at 1660 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). However, after the passage of section 26 
supporters of race-conscious admissions must endure the arduous task of obtaining either a two-
thirds majority vote from both Houses of the Michigan state legislature or meet the requirements 
for a ballot initiative to support their interests, which requires ten percent of the total number of 
votes cast in the previous gubernational election. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–2 (delineating 
the Michigan requirements for Constitutional amendment). 
 129. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1660 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 1664. 
 131. McNeal, supra note 121, at 571. 
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race-conscious admissions,132 the negative impact on school desegregation 
efforts will be felt for years. The law’s prohibition of race-conscious policies to 
ensure that students receive the educational benefits that flow from diversity 
articulated in Grutter undermines prior judicial efforts to integrate K-12 
schools. Additionally, the Schuette decision sends a symbolic and substantive 
message to opponents of affirmative action that the political process may be 
used to restructure governmental decision-making to create state laws that 
promote, as opposed to hinder, racial discrimination. This is further evidenced 
by the Court’s repudiation of the Seattle Court’s recognition of the importance 
of balancing constitutional protections and state sovereignty to prevent the 
reallocation of power in a manner that unfairly burdens minority interests 
within the political process.133 This practice morally excludes minorities by 
allowing the political process to become a tool of manipulation to advance the 
interests of the majority at the expense of the minority. The codification of 
racial discrimination into law under the guise of preserving democracy is a 
facade to obscure the systemic moral exclusion of minorities. As Justice 
Sotomayor so eloquently stated in her dissent: 
But what the majority could not do, consistent with the Constitution, is change 
the ground rules of the political process in a manner that makes it more 
difficult for racial minorities alone to achieve their goals. In doing so, the 
majority effectively rigs the contest to guarantee a particular outcome. That is 
the very wrong the political-process doctrine seeks to remedy. The doctrine 
“hews to the unremarkable notion that when two competitors are running a 
race, one may not require the other to run twice as far or to scale obstacles not 
present in the first runner’s course.”134 
Due to the Court’s deliberate indifference to anti-affirmative action 
constituents’ manipulation of the political process doctrine, anti-discrimination 
laws such as article I, section 26 achieve their intended purpose, which is to 
promote a more narrow view of constitutional protections that lay the 
groundwork for the rejection of “unnecessary” race-conscious laws.135 
 
 132. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (“[This case] is not about the constitutionality, or the merits, 
of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education. . . . The question here concerns . . . 
whether, and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of 
racial preferences in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”). 
 133. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982) (“[W]e do not 
undervalue the magnitude of the State’s interest in its system of education. Washington could 
have reserved to state officials the right to make all decision in the areas of education and student 
assignment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate system; having done so, the State is 
obligated to operate the system within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 134. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1670 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 135. Powell, supra note 2, at 452. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Schuette decision is just another step toward the demise of race-
conscious school admissions policies designed to create diverse and equitable 
schools. Since the historic Brown v. Board of Education decision, the Court 
has slowly retreated from the promise of Brown by discounting the 
significance of race in equal educational opportunity. The paradigm shift in the 
Court, from a substantive role in educational equity to mere bystanders, is 
evident by the majority’s rhetoric in education-related cases. In Parents 
Involved, Chief Justice Roberts stated, “The way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”136 Seven years later 
Justice Sotomayor, who was not on the court in 2007 when Parents Involved 
was decided, said in her dissent in Schuette, “The way to stop discrimination 
on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and 
to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries 
of racial discrimination.”137 The Justices’ divergent perceptions regarding the 
state of race relations in the country and what impact, if any, it has on equitable 
outcomes for minority students are very disconcerting. As the movement to 
abolish race-conscious preferences continues, it is imperative that stakeholders 
in education debunk false notions of a post-racial society and demonstrate the 
harmful effects of racially isolated learning environments for minorities and 
society at-large. This can be accomplished through creating a stronger 
evidentiary basis to demonstrate the correlation between diverse learning 
environments and student achievement outcomes to support equal protection 
challenges to racially segregated schools. Additionally, proponents of race-
conscious policies must make a concerted effort to garner greater support 
within their individual communities to defeat the passage of state ballot 
initiatives that are designed to undermine school integration efforts such as 
article I, section 26. 
In closing, the Supreme Court’s decision in Schuette is a dangerous step in 
the wrong direction because, as Justice Sotomayor said in her dissenting 
opinion, “[W]ithout checks, democratically approved legislation can oppress 
minority groups.”138 We must create procedural safeguards to protect minority 
interests that are at the core of our democratic ideals from the tyranny of the 
majority. The shortfalls of our education system are disconcerting because 
democracy and education are inextricably linked. As a nation with a 
foundation built on democracy, how can we continue to uphold our democratic 
ideals of freedom, equality, and justice for all with an education system that 
privileges some while marginalizing others? This notion is best captured in the 
 
 136. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
 137. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 138. Id. at 1651. 
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following quote by John Kenneth Galbraith, “[E]ducation makes democracy 
possible, and, along with economic development, it makes it necessary, even 
inevitable.”139 
 
 
 139. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GOOD SOCIETY: THE HUMANE AGENDA 72 (1996). 
